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unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States in 2012.1 The Pew Research Center’s 
unauthorized alien population estimate for 2012 was 11.2 million, which included some 8.1 million 
unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce.2 It is widely believed that most unauthorized aliens 
enter and remain in the United States in order to work. 
Six years ago, in 2009, DHS issued new guidance on immigration-related worksite enforcement—the 
enforcement of prohibitions on the employment of unauthorized aliens in the United States. In the words 
of DHS at the time, the 2009 guidance “reflects a renewed Department-wide focus targeting criminal 
aliens and employers who cultivate illegal workplaces by breaking the country’s laws and knowingly hiring 
illegal workers.”3 Under this guidance, promoting compliance also has taken on a larger role in DHS’s 
worksite enforcements efforts. 
Questions arise as to how rigorous and effective DHS’s worksite enforcement efforts are and have been 
in past years. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to examine the 
performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor 
(DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address unauthorized employment. DOL, which 
is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant 
percentage of its enforcement resources on low-wage industries that employ large numbers of 
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Summary 
Under current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance on immigration-related 
worksite enforcement, the agency uses available civil and administrative tools, including civil 
fines and debarment, to penalize and prevent unlawful employment. According to 2012 estimates, 
there are some 8.1 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian labor force. 
DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for immigration-related 
worksite enforcement, or enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in Section 
274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA Section 274A provisions, 
sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly 
hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so 
employed. Today, ICE’s worksite enforcement program is focused primarily on cases that involve 
critical infrastructure facilities and cases involving employers who commit “egregious” violations 
of criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation. 
Employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to 
civil monetary penalties and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in 
defendants being charged with crimes beyond unlawful employment and being subject to the 
relevant penalties for those violations. 
Various measures are available to examine the performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement 
program. They include Final Orders for civil monetary penalties, administrative fines, 
administrative arrests, criminal arrests, criminal indictments, criminal convictions, and criminal 
fines and forfeitures. In addition to examining annual changes and trends in the various 
performance measure data, these data can be considered in relation to the estimated size of the 
unauthorized workforce or the potential number of employers employing these workers. When 
considered in this context, ICE’s worksite enforcement program can seem quite limited. 
Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of 
federal efforts to curtail unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing 
minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its 
enforcement resources on low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and 
presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers. 
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Introduction 
According to the estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some 11.4 million 
unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States in 2012.1 The Pew Research Center’s 
unauthorized alien population estimate for 2012 was 11.2 million, which included some 8.1 
million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce.2 It is widely believed that most 
unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work.  
Six years ago, in 2009, DHS issued new guidance on immigration-related worksite 
enforcement—the enforcement of prohibitions on the employment of unauthorized aliens in the 
United States. In the words of DHS at the time, the 2009 guidance “reflects a renewed 
Department-wide focus targeting criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal workplaces 
by breaking the country’s laws and knowingly hiring illegal workers.”3 Under this guidance, 
promoting compliance also has taken on a larger role in DHS’s worksite enforcements efforts.  
Questions arise as to how rigorous and effective DHS’s worksite enforcement efforts are and have 
been in past years. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to 
examine the performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the 
Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address 
unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime 
pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on 
low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of 
unauthorized—workers. 
DHS Enforcement 
Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)4 prohibits employers from employing 
individuals who they know are not authorized to work. More specifically, the INA Section 274A 
provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to 
knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to 
be so employed. These provisions also make it unlawful for an employer to hire an individual for 
employment without examining documents to verify the new hire’s identity and work eligibility, 
and completing and retaining verification forms, known as I-9 forms. These verification 
procedures, commonly referred to as the I-9 process or the I-9 requirements, are separate from the 
largely voluntary E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, which is 
administered by DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).5 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States: January 2012, by Bryan C. Baker and Nancy Rytina, March 2013, p.1. 
2 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in & States, Fall in 14: Decline in Those 
From Mexico Fuels Most State Decreases, Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project, November 18, 2014, pp. 6, 
16. 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Worksite Enforcement 
Overview,” fact sheet, April 30, 2009. 
4 Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, as amended. The INA is the basis of current immigration law. 
5 For information on E-Verify, see CRS Report R40446, Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification, by Andorra 
Bruno.  
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Enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in INA Section 274A—or worksite 
enforcement—has been the job of DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
since 2003.6 Worksite enforcement is one component of ICE’s responsibility to enforce federal 
immigration laws within the United States, known as interior enforcement. Employers violating 
the INA Section 274A prohibitions on unlawful employment may be subject to civil and/or 
criminal penalties. 
The federal government’s approach to immigration-related worksite enforcement has changed 
over the years. In 1999, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) unveiled 
an interior enforcement strategy, which, as explained by an INS official at the time, gave priority 
in the area of worksite enforcement to two types of cases: (1) criminal employer cases, in which 
there was a pattern or practice of knowingly employing unauthorized workers, and (2) cases of 
employers who abused their workers and who violated multiple laws.7 In the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, interior enforcement priorities again shifted. Resources 
were redirected from traditional program areas, including worksite enforcement, to national 
security-related investigations, and the primary focus of worksite enforcement became removal of 
unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure facilities such as airports and military bases.8 
Under the worksite enforcement guidance issued in 2009, homeland security remains a primary 
concern of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. As described by ICE: “Investigations involving 
national security, public safety or those associated with our critical infrastructure and key 
resources sectors receive top priority.” According to ICE, the agency also prioritizes criminally 
prosecuting employers who “utilize unauthorized workers as a business model,” “mistreat their 
workers,” or “engage in human smuggling or trafficking,” among other violations.9  
In recent years, ICE also has placed “increased emphasis on compliance and outreach” in 
conducting worksite enforcement.10 It has increased its use of inspections, or audits, of business 
owners’ I-9 records (see above) to determine whether they are in compliance with employment 
eligibility verification laws and regulations.11 In addition, the agency promotes the ICE Mutual 
Agreement between Government and Employers (IMAGE) program as a way to reduce 
unauthorized employment.12 
                                                 
6 Prior to March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice was 
responsible for interior enforcement. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002) 
abolished INS and transferred most of its functions to DHS as of March 1, 2003. 
7 See written statement of Robert Bach, Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, INS, in U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service’s Interior Enforcement Strategy, 106th Cong., 1st sess., July 1, 1999 (Washington: GPO, 2000), 
p. 13. 
8 For further discussion of these policy shifts, see archived CRS Report RL33351, Immigration Enforcement Within the 
United States, coordinated by Alison Siskin. 
9 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Worksite Enforcement,” 
fact sheet, April 1, 2013, http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/worksite (hereinafter cited as 2013 Worksite Enforcement fact 
sheet). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Upon being serviced with of a Notice of Inspection, an employer is required to produce I-9 forms. ICE may also ask 
the employer for supporting documentation, such as a copy of the payroll. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Form I-9 Inspection Overview,” fact sheet, June 26, 2013, 
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection. 
12 See description of IMAGE program on the ICE website, http://www.ice.gov/image.  
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Penalties 
As discussed above, employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of 
aliens may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties. 
Civil Penalties 
Under INA Section 274A, civil money penalties can be imposed for failing to comply with the I-9 
employment verification requirements and for knowingly hiring, recruiting or referring for a fee, 
or continuing to employ an unauthorized alien.13 A person or entity determined to have violated 
the I-9 requirements may be subject to a fine of not less than $110 and not more than $1,100 for 
each individual with respect to whom a violation occurred after September 29, 1999. A person or 
entity found to have engaged in hiring, recruiting, referring, or employing violations may be 
subject to a cease and desist order and to fines, as follows: 
• for a first offense, not less than $275 and not more than $2,200 for each 
unauthorized alien with respect to whom the offense occurred before March 27, 
2008, and not less than $375 and not more than $3,200 for each unauthorized 
alien with respect to whom the offense occurred on or after March 27, 2008; 
• for a second offense, not less than $2,200 and not more than $5,500 for each 
unauthorized alien with respect to whom the offense occurred before March 27, 
2008, and not less than $3,200 and not more than $6,500 for each unauthorized 
alien with respect to whom the offense occurred on or after March 27, 2008; and 
• for more than two offenses, not less than $3,300 and not more than $11,000 for 
each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the third or later offense occurred 
before March 27, 2008, and not less than $4,300 and not more than $16,000 for 
each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the third or subsequent offense 
occurred on or after March 27, 2008. 
If ICE believes that an employer has committed a civil violation, the agency may issue the 
employer a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF). A NIF may result in a Final Order for civil money 
penalties, a settlement, or a dismissal. 
Criminal Penalties 
Under INA Section 274A, employers convicted of having engaged in a pattern or practice of 
knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens may face criminal fines and/or 
imprisonment. They may be fined not more than $3,000 for each unauthorized alien with respect 
to whom the violation occurred and/or imprisoned for not more than six months for the entire 
pattern or practice. Criminal investigations may result in employers and other individuals being 
charged with crimes other than unlawful employment, such as document fraud or harboring 
unauthorized aliens, and being subject to the relevant penalties for those violations. 
                                                 
13 Current fine amounts are set forth in 8 C.F.R. §274a.10. They reflect increases that took effect in 1999 and 2008 
pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (in P.L. 104-134, April 26, 1996). 
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Program Performance 
A variety of measures can be used to assess the performance of the DHS worksite enforcement 
program. Over the years, such assessments have been complicated by data reporting problems, 
the existence of conflicting data, and other issues. Unless otherwise noted, all data presented here 
were provided directly to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) by ICE. The paucity of 
comparable and/or reliable data for the pre-ICE worksite enforcement program, as indicated by 
ICE to CRS, however, limits the ability to place the recent performance data in historical context. 
Administrative Fines 
As discussed above, INA Section 274A establishes civil penalties for violations of the I-9 
requirements and for unlawful employment. Table 1 provides annual data on Final Orders for 
civil money penalties (also known as civil or administrative fines) for FY1999 through FY2014. 
It shows that after increasing between FY1999 and FY2000, the number of Final Orders and 
associated administrative fines decreased from FY2000 to FY2004. In FY2006, both measures 
equaled “0.” Since FY2006, both measures have posted gains.  
Table 1 reflects changes over the years in the use of administrative fines as an enforcement tool. 
As noted above, the new DHS worksite enforcement strategy makes increased use of civil fines. 
In written testimony for a 2009 House hearing, Marcy Forman, then director of the ICE Office of 
Investigations, discussed ICE’s renewed focus on civil fines: 
In crafting our worksite enforcement strategy, ICE has restructured the worksite 
administrative fine process to build a more vigorous program. ICE has established and 
distributed to all field offices guidance about the issuance of administrative fines and 
standardized criteria for the imposition of such fines. We expect that the increased use of the 
administrative fines process will result in meaningful penalties for those who engage in the 
employment of unauthorized workers.14 
Despite the increases in recent years, however, the number of Final Orders for civil money 
penalties remains very low relative to the number of U.S. employers. Employers receiving Final 
Orders in FY2014, as shown in Table 1, represent less than .02% of U.S. employers.15 
                                                 
14 Written statement of Marcy M. Forman for U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law, hearing, 111th Congress, 1st sess., April 2, 2009. For a 
contrary view about the usefulness of administrative fines, see written statement of ICE official Matthew Allen, in U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Is the Federal Government 
Doing All It Can to Stem the Tide of Illegal Immigration?, hearing, 109th Congress, 2nd sess., July 25, 2006 
(Washington: GPO, 2007), pp. 43-53. 
15 According to U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) annual data, there were 5.7 million firms in 
the United States in 2012. A firm is defined as “a business organization consisting of one or more domestic 
establishments in the same state and industry that were specified under common ownership or control.” SUSB data and 
definitions are available at http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/. 
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Table 1. Final Orders and Administrative Fines, FY1999-FY2014 
Fiscal  
Year 
Number of Final  
Orders Issued 
Administrative  
Fines Imposed 
1999 215 $1,674,672 
2000 312 $3,337,472 
2001 297 $2,037,509 
2002 91 $485,128 
2003 52 $289,814 
2004 10 $90,249 
2005 10 $455,870 
2006 0 $0 
2007 2 $26,560 
2008 18 $675,209 
2009 52 $1,033,291 
2010 237 $6,956,026 
2011 385 $10,463,988 
2012 495 $12,475,575 
2013 637 $15,808,365 
2014 642 $16,275,821 
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, May 3, 2012 (FY1999-FY2008) and March 11, 2015 (FY2009-FY2014). 
Note: “Administrative Fines Imposed” is the same as ICE’s measure of “Final Order Amounts.”  
Administrative and Criminal Arrests 
Administrative and criminal arrests are other measures of worksite enforcement activity. 
Administrative arrests are for civil violations of the INA, such as being illegally present in the 
United States. Only a noncitizen can be the subject of an administrative arrest, which represents 
an initial step in the process of removing an alien from the United States. It seems reasonable to 
assume that most individuals arrested on administrative charges are non-managerial employees. 
Criminal arrests include arrests for illegal hiring as well as for identity theft, alien harboring, 
money laundering, and other criminal violations. Citizens and noncitizens alike can be the subject 
of criminal arrests, as can non-managerial employees, managerial employees, and employers. 
Table 2. Administrative and Criminal Arrests in Worksite Enforcement Operations, 
FY2003-FY2014 
Fiscal  
Year 
Number of Individuals Arrested  
on Administrative Charges 
Number of Individuals Arrested  
on Criminal Charges 
2003 445 72 
2004 685 165 
2005 1,116 176 
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Fiscal  
Year 
Number of Individuals Arrested  
on Administrative Charges 
Number of Individuals Arrested  
on Criminal Charges 
2006 3,667 716 
2007 4,077 863 
2008 5,184 1,103 
2009 1,644 410 
2010 1,224 393 
2011 1,471 713 
2012 1,118 520 
2013 868 452 
2014 541 362 
Sources: CRS presentation of data from written statement of the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, February 28, 2007 (FY2003-
FY2004); and from Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, July 1, 2008 
(FY2005-FY2007), April 22, 2010 (FY2008), and March 11, 2015 (FY2009-FY2014). 
Note: The same individual may be the subject of an administrative arrest and a criminal arrest. 
During each year from FY2003 to FY2008, as shown in Table 2, the number of administrative 
and criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations increased; some of the yearly changes, as 
from FY2005 to FY2006, were marked. In 2008 congressional testimony, then-DHS Secretary 
Michael Chertoff highlighted the number of administrative and criminal arrests in worksite 
enforcement operations in FY2007 as evidence of the progress being made by ICE on the 
worksite enforcement front.16  
Between FY2008 and FY2009, as indicated in Table 2, the number of individuals arrested on 
administrative and criminal charges plummeted. Since FY2011, there has been a steady decline in 
the number of both types of arrests. The reasons for the overall decreases in administrative and 
criminal arrests between FY2008 and FY2014 are unclear, but they may reflect, to some degree, 
ICE’s stated renewed focus on employers. 
In his 2011 House testimony, then-ICE Deputy Director Kibble responded to concerns expressed 
by some Members of Congress about the diminished number of administrative arrests in worksite 
enforcement operations: 
The number of administrative arrests at worksites cannot, and should not, be considered in a 
vacuum. For the past two years, our worksite efforts have been part of a broader enforcement 
strategy that has seen the removal of more individuals from the United States than at any 
other time in the agency’s history. ICE is apprehending, detaining, and removing an 
unprecedented number of individuals who are unlawfully present in the country—regardless 
of where they are apprehended.17 
                                                 
16 See written statement of DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff for U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Homeland Security Oversight, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 2008. 
17 Written statement of ICE Deputy Director Kumar Kibble for U.S. Congress, House Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, ICE Worksite Enforcement—Up to the Job?, hearing, 112th 
Cong., 1st sess., January 26, 2011. 
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ICE worksite enforcement arrest statistics for FY2009 and FY2010 provided to CRS contain 
employment position titles for most individuals who were arrested on administrative or criminal 
charges.18 Of the 1,647 total worksite enforcement administrative arrests in FY2009, employment 
position information is available for 1,153 individuals.19 Non-managerial employees accounted 
for 1,112 of these 1,153 arrests (96%), while managerial employees with position titles that 
included owner, manager, and corporate official accounted for the remaining 41 arrests (4%). Of 
the 1,217 total administrative arrests in FY2010, employment position information is available for 
897 individuals.20 Non-managerial employees accounted for 821 of these 897 arrests (92%), 
while managerial employees accounted for the remaining 76 arrests (8%).21 
With respect to worksite enforcement criminal arrests, employment position information is 
available for 403 of the 444 individuals arrested on criminal charges in FY2009.22 These 403 
individuals included 289 non-managerial employees (72%) and 114 managerial employees with 
position titles that included owner, manager, and corporate official (28%). Of the 448 individuals 
arrested on criminal charges in FY2010, employment position information is available for 385.23 
Non-managerial employees accounted for 189 of these 385 arrests (49%), while managerial 
employees accounted for 196 criminal arrests (51%). Thus, while the number of overall criminal 
arrests in worksite enforcement operations was quite similar between FY2009 and FY2010, the 
number of managerial employees among the arrestees increased from 114 to 196. This increase, 
which is in line with ICE’s stated focus in the worksite enforcement area on criminally 
investigating and prosecuting employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers, follows a 
decline in criminal arrests among managerial employees between FY2008 and FY2009. The 
comparable number of managerial employee criminal arrests in FY2008 was 135, according to 
ICE.24  
The representation of managerial employees among those criminally arrested varied in FY2012 
and FY2013. For FY2012, as for FY2010, it seems that about half of the individuals criminally 
arrested in connection with worksite enforcement investigations were managerial employees. 
According to ICE, 240 of the 520 individuals arrested on criminal charges in FY2012 were 
owners, managers, supervisors, or human resources personnel. For FY2013, managerial 
employees accounted for about 40% of criminal arrests in connection with worksite enforcement 
                                                 
18 ICE worksite enforcement arrest statistics grouped by position provided by ICE Office of Congressional Relations to 
CRS, May 27, 2010 (FY2009 statistics, as of October 29, 2009), and February 10, 2011 (FY2010 statistics, as of 
February 9, 2011). Please note that since these statistics were provided, ICE has updated its FY2009 and FY2010 data 
on administrative and criminal arrests; the updated data are provided in Table 2. Although CRS does not have 
comparably updated worksite enforcement arrest statistics grouped by position, we are retaining these data in this 
report for the additional detail they provide. As a result, the FY2009 and FY2010 statistics discussed here do not match 
the data in Table 2.  
19 The 1,153 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no 
worksite involvement. 
20 The 897 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no worksite 
involvement. 
21 Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
22 The 403 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no worksite 
involvement. 
23 The 385 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no worksite 
involvement. 
24 Data provided by ICE Office of Congressional Relations to CRS, June 8, 2010. While the FY2008 and FY2009 
employer criminal arrest data are roughly comparable, it should be noted that ICE had different reporting systems in the 
two years.  
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investigations. ICE reports that 179 of the 452 individuals arrested on criminal charges in 
FY2013 were owners, managers, supervisors, or human resources personnel.25  
Viewed more broadly, ICE administrative and criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations 
represent a very small percentage of the potential population of violators. For example, Table 2 
shows a high of 5,184 administrative arrests in worksite operations in FY2008. That year, 
according to the Pew Research Center, there were an estimated 8.3 million unauthorized aliens in 
the U.S. civilian labor force.26 With respect to criminal arrests, the potential population of 
employers and workers committing worksite-related criminal violations is not known. 
Criminal Prosecutions and Fines 
Table 3 provides data on criminal prosecutions related to worksite enforcement investigations for 
FY2005-FY2014.27 These data, which include employers and managerial and non-managerial 
employees, build on the criminal arrest data in Table 2. As shown in Table 3, the number of 
criminal indictments and criminal convictions rose steadily from FY2005 until FY2008. Both 
measures then fell markedly between FY2008 and FY2009 and have followed no consistent 
pattern since. It is difficult to draw direct conclusions from these data about the worksite 
enforcement program in any particular year. One reason for this is that there can be time lags 
between arrests, indictments, and convictions. 
Table 3. Criminal Indictments and Convictions Related to Worksite Enforcement 
Investigations, FY2005-FY2014 
Fiscal Year Indictments Convictions 
2005 254 156 
2006 411 340 
2007 750 561 
2008 900 908 
2009 292 287 
2010 309 282  
2011 347 364 
2012 318 292 
2013 296 319 
2014 327 312 
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, July 1, 2008 (FY2005-FY2007), April 22, 2010 (FY2008), and March 11, 2015 (FY2009-FY2014). 
Note: A conviction may occur in the same year as the related indictment or in a subsequent year. 
                                                 
25 2013 Worksite Enforcement fact sheet. Please note that a previously available version of this fact sheet included 
FY2012 data on criminal arrests. The current version includes FY2013 data on criminal arrests but still carries a date of 
April 1, 2013.  
26 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, Pew Hispanic 
Center, April 14, 2009, p. 12. 
27 Comparable data are not available for earlier years. 
Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures 
 
Congressional Research Service 9 
Table 4 provides data on criminal fines and forfeitures related to worksite enforcement 
investigations that were imposed in FY2003-FY2014. ICE characterizes these data as follows: 
Criminal fines and forfeitures include fines imposed by a U.S. District Court as a result of a 
criminal conviction, seizures made by ICE and forfeited to the U.S. government, payments 
made to ICE in lieu of the seizure and forfeiture of real or personal property, and restitution 
payments made by an employer to their unauthorized alien employees as a result of labor law 
violations.28 
As shown in Table 4, worksite enforcement-related criminal fines and forfeitures have varied 
dramatically during the FY2003-FY2014 period, although they have remained well above the 
FY2003 level in all subsequent years. In light of the various types of fines and forfeitures (as 
indicated in the above description from ICE) and associated time lags, which presumably help 
explain the great annual variability, it may be that the total for any particular year is less 
significant than the fact that criminal fines and forfeitures were being pursued.  
Table 4. Criminal Fines and Forfeitures Related to Worksite Enforcement 
Investigations, FY2003-FY2014 
Fiscal Year Criminal Fines and Forfeitures Imposed 
2003 $37,514 
2004 $2,929,000 
2005 $15,822,100 
2006 $233,044 
2007 $31,426,443 
2008 $21,978,918 
2009 $31,244,945 
2010 $36,611,320 
2011 $7,189,631 
2012 $14,205,865 
2013 $2,245,366 
2014 $35,131,058 
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, July 1, 2008 (FY2003-FY2007), April 22, 2010 (FY2008), and March 11, 2015 (FY2009-FY2014). 
In summary, the data presented here offer an available, but limited, means to examine the 
performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. Some measures, namely Final Orders 
issued and administrative fines imposed, followed a downward trend after 2000 and then an 
upward trend after FY2006. Other measures, namely administrative arrests, criminal arrests, 
criminal indictments, and criminal convictions, registered increases from the initial years 
included here until FY2008, followed by significant decreases from FY2008 to FY2009. From 
FY2011 to FY2014, there was a steady decrease in both administrative and criminal arrests, while 
the yearly changes in criminal arrests and criminal indictments did not follow a consistent pattern. 
The FY2014 values for all four measures were below the FY2011 levels. The data on criminal 
                                                 
28 E-mail from ICE Office of Congressional Relations to CRS, July 1, 2008. 
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fines and forfeitures imposed, the remaining measure, reveal no discernible pattern. More 
generally, the values of the various measures for the years shown seem quite small relative to the 
estimated size of the unauthorized workforce. 
DOL Enforcement 
While the authority to enforce the INA employer sanctions provisions rests with DHS, INA 
Section 274A does grant DOL the authority to review I-9 verification forms (see above). Under 
INA Section 274A(b)(3), employers must make completed I-9 forms available to DOL officers 
for inspection.  
DOL has separate authority to enforce federal labor laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA),29 which establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, youth employment, and other 
standards. The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL Employment Standards 
Administration (ESA) administers and enforces the FLSA with respect to private sector workers, 
state and local government employees, and certain federal employees. Historically, DOL officials 
have been cautious about delving into questions of work authorization in their labor standards 
investigations because of concerns that it “might impede their ability to gain the trust of illegal 
aliens who may be the victims of labor violations and potential witnesses against employers.”30  
DOL and DHS signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on worksite enforcement in 
March 2011 that delineates the enforcement roles of each agency and the ways in which they will 
work together to further their respective missions.31 The MOU summarizes the importance of 
enforcing worksite-related labor and immigration laws, as follows: 
Effective enforcement of labor law is essential to ensure proper wages and working 
conditions for all covered workers regardless of immigration status. Effective enforcement of 
immigration law is essential to protect the employment rights of lawful U.S. workers, 
whether citizen or non-citizen, and to reduce the incentive for illegal migration to the United 
States. 
The MOU seeks to avoid conflicts in the worksite enforcement activities of DOL and DHS. As 
part of the MOU, ICE agrees not to conduct civil worksite enforcement activities at a worksite 
that is the subject of an existing DOL investigation of a labor dispute, except as specified. A labor 
dispute is defined in the MOU as a dispute between employees and managers/owners over 
employee rights, including the right to be paid the minimum wage, a promised or contracted 
wage, or overtime; the right to work in a safe workplace; and the right not to be subject to 
unlawful discrimination. Under the MOU, ICE can conduct worksite enforcement activities 
during a pending labor dispute in certain circumstances, such as when the Director of ICE 
determines that the enforcement activity is independently necessary to further an investigation 
concerning national security, the protection of critical infrastructure, or other federal crimes.  
                                                 
29 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, as amended. 
30 B. Lindsay Lowell, Susan F. Martin, and Micah N. Bump, Worksite Solutions to Unauthorized Migration, Institute 
for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, October 2007, p. 12 (hereinafter cited as Worksite 
Solutions to Unauthorized Migration). 
31 The MOU is available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf. This MOU supersedes a 1998 
MOU originally signed by ESA and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. 
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ICE and DOL also agree as part of the MOU to work together to prevent manipulation of the 
enforcement process. To this end, ICE agrees to act to “thwart attempts by other parties to 
manipulate its worksite enforcement activities for illicit or improper purposes.” DOL agrees to 
assist ICE in these efforts by sharing relevant information. 
Compliance Activities in Low-Wage Industries 
While DOL’s direct role in immigration-related worksite enforcement is quite limited, some 
maintain that the agency helps reduce unauthorized employment indirectly through its 
enforcement of labor laws. This argument is premised on the belief that many employers who 
employ unauthorized aliens also violate labor laws. A 2007 paper by Georgetown University’s 
Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) notes that employers have different 
propensities to hire unauthorized workers, and describes a category of employers that “knowingly 
hire[s] unauthorized workers to exploit their labor.” According to the paper, “such employers may 
pay salaries in cash, failing to pay their share of social security taxes; and they may seek 
unauthorized workers because they are less likely to complain about ill treatment.”32 Thus, with 
respect to unauthorized employment, enforcement of minimum wage, overtime, and other 
statutory requirements may serve as a means of reducing the economic incentives to hire 
unauthorized workers and thus result in decreased demand for these workers.  
Some other observers, such as former WHD Administrator Maria Echaveste, however, point out 
the limitations of using labor law enforcement to address unauthorized employment. They argue 
that many employers who hire unauthorized immigrants do not violate wage and hour laws. 
According to Echaveste: 
I know firsthand that many employers who comply with other labor standards still hire the 
undocumented. Many businesses pay the minimum wage and have barely tolerable working 
conditions because there are sufficient undocumented workers willing to accept those terms. 
If we care about low-income workers in this country, we need to create pressure to improve 
their economic condition by reducing the supply of unauthorized workers.33 
To the extent that some employers of unauthorized aliens violate labor standards, WHD’s 
compliance activities in low-wage industries may be particularly relevant to efforts to reduce 
unauthorized employment, as these industries may employ significant numbers of unauthorized 
aliens.34 Table 5 provides data on WHD investigations in nine low-wage industries in FY2014. 
That year, as indicated in Table 5, WHD collected $79.1 million in back wages for FLSA 
overtime and minimum wage violations for about 109,000 workers. Top industries in terms of 
both the amount in back wages collected and the number of employees receiving back wages 
were restaurants and health care. 
                                                 
32 Worksite Solutions to Unauthorized Migration, p. vi-vii. 
33 Maria Echaveste, “Target Employers,” American Prospect, October 23, 2005, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?
article=target_employers#. 
34 WHD low-wage industries statistics are available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/statstables.htm#lowwage. 
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Table 5. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Nine Low-Wage Industries: FY2014 
  
Industry 
Number of  
Cases 
Back Wages  
Collected 
Number of Employees 
Receiving Back Wages 
Restaurants 5,118 $34,451,990 44,133 
Health Care 1,581 $17,703,092 21,029 
Agriculture 1,430 $4,502,976 12,031 
Day Care 1,144 $1,875,156 5,812 
Hotels & Motels 1,049 $4,040,376 7,420 
Janitorial Services 523 $3,902,434 4,425 
Guard Services 475 $5,659,936 6,729 
Temporary Help 368 $3,915,498 6,009 
Garment Manufacturing 239 $3,095,832 1,673 
Total 11,927 $79,147,290 109,261 
Source: Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division. 
Table 6 provides data on low-wage industry cases and back wage collections for FLSA overtime 
and minimum wage violations for FY2003-FY2014. As shown in Table 6, the number of cases in 
low-wage industries generally decreased between FY2003 and FY2010 and then increased, 
reaching a high point in FY2013. This was followed by a drop between FY2013 and FY2014 that 
put the number of cases in FY2014 below the FY2003 level. Back wage collections and the 
number of employees receiving back wages registered greater overall increases than did the 
number of cases between FY2003 and FY2012, when both back wage measures reached high 
points. Despite subsequent decreases in both measures, the FY2013 and FY2014 values for both 
back wage collections and the number of employees receiving back wages were well above the 
FY2003 levels. More generally, though, when considered in the larger context of the potential 
number of employers in these low-wage industries that may be violating FLSA requirements with 
respect to unauthorized workers, or workers generally, the numbers in Table 5 and Table 6, as in 
the ICE data tables, are relatively small. 
Table 6. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2003-FY2014 
 Fiscal 
 Year 
Number of  
Cases 
Back Wages  
Collected 
Number of Employees 
Receiving Back Wages 
 2003 12,962 $39,595,382 80,772 
2004 12,625 $43,141,911 84,897 
2005 12,468 $45,783,743 96,511 
2006 11,172 $50,566,661 86,780 
2007 11,382 $52,722,681 86,560 
2008 10,299 $57,549,645 76,903 
2009 9,360 $52,063,110 80,759 
2010 9,303 $53,324,841 74,666 
2011 12,225 $59,132,496 108,064 
2012 13,431 $97,912,954 124,768 
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 Fiscal 
 Year 
Number of  
Cases 
Back Wages  
Collected 
Number of Employees 
Receiving Back Wages 
2013 13,754 $83,051,160 108,050 
2014 11,927 $79,147,290 109,261 
Source: Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division. 
Conclusion 
The data provided here on Final Orders, administrative fines, administrative and criminal arrests, 
criminal indictments and prosecutions, and criminal fines offer a way to assess DHS’s worksite 
enforcement strategy over the years and in its current form. More broadly, it can be argued that 
the ultimate test for any approach to worksite enforcement by DHS or DOL is whether it helps 
reduce the size of the unauthorized labor force in the United States. 
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